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REMARKS OF STEPHEN M. CUTLER, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
AT THE F. HODGE O’NEAL CORPORATE AND 
SECURITIES LAW SYMPOSIUM 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
February 21, 2003 
 
The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for 
any private publication or statement by any of its employees. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the staff of 
the Commission. 
 
Good afternoon. It’s a pleasure to be here. The description of this panel 
suggests numerous tempting topics, but I thought I would use my time to 
address one that for me has left the realm of the theoretical and entered the 
very real world of my daily life as head of the SEC’s enforcement program. 
Specifically, I’d like to share with you my views, and they are only my views 
and not those of the Commission or its staff, on the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of the federal government and the states in the regulation of 
our securities markets.  
It’s an issue that has received a lot of attention as of late. Indeed, at the 
Senate Banking Committee hearing held last week to consider his 
nomination as SEC Chairman, Bill Donaldson was asked by a member of the 
Committee for his thoughts on this subject. Chairman Donaldson observed 
that “one of the great strengths of our market system is that it is a national 
market system and has not been Balkanized.”  
During the last 12 months, the overlapping responsibilities of federal and 
state securities agencies have been vividly illustrated by the joint 
investigations of research analyst practices undertaken by the SEC, the self-
regulatory organizations, and the states. On December 20 of last year, the 
Commission, along with the NASD, New York Stock Exchange, New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, and other state regulators, announced a 
settlement-in-principle with the nation’s top investment firms to address 
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issues of conflict of interest between investment banking and research analyst 
activities at major brokerage firms. The “global settlement,” if finalized, 
would address firm (but not individual) liability.  
The announcement of the global settlement was preceded by the New 
York Attorney General’s action against Merrill Lynch, and then an extensive 
joint investigation among the SEC, the self-regulatory organizations, and the 
states. Although this process has by no means come to a close—indeed, until 
the Commission authorizes the global settlement-in-principle, not even that 
aspect of the matter will be final—I view this effort as having been 
instructive for regulators as well as beneficial to investors.  
The investigation of research analyst practices has been a singular one not 
only for the breadth and importance of the issues being examined, but for the 
number of different regulators who have actively participated. Perhaps for 
these reasons, it has been, and continues to be, particularly effective at 
highlighting important questions concerning the roles of the SEC and state 
agencies in effecting change in the securities markets. As I’ve grappled with 
these questions, it has occurred to me that there may exist certain common 
principles discernible from the history of the securities laws that should guide 
federal and state securities regulators alike. After all, we are all public 
servants doing our best to give life to the dual regulatory system that 
Congress created. Moreover, keeping our eyes firmly on these principles 
might, in fact, guide us more effectively in dealing with issues of 
state/federal cooperation than would any bright-line rules we might struggle 
to articulate. Today’s forum provides me an opportunity to explore these 
principles in a deliberate fashion. 
Indeed, in preparing for this panel, I’ve found that pursuit of a fairly 
limited number of central principles animated the lawmakers who created, 
and subsequently revised, the dual regulatory system in which we operate. 
With that in mind, I’d like to use my time, first, to identify and discuss these 
historically important goals, and then to consider the implications of these 
priorities for contemporary federal/state cooperation in the securities 
regulation arena. 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Policy makers have been debating the roles of the federal and state 
governments in protecting investors since before the 1933 and 1934 Acts and 
the creation of the SEC. Decades before the first federal securities law was 
adopted, states had begun to implement the so-called blue sky laws. These 
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statutes were enacted in response to the ever-increasing prevalence of 
overvalued, speculative, and fraudulent securities.1 Such legislation was very 
popular, and between 1911, when Kansas adopted the first blue sky law, and 
1933, when the first federal securities statute was adopted, all states, except 
Nevada, implemented such laws.2 
Despite this blanket of state regulation, by the 1930s there was 
widespread demand for the federal government to assume a role in policing 
the markets. According to a Department of Commerce Report, 
“notwithstanding . . . protective state laws, there has never been a period in 
history when the public has been so grossly mulcted of accumulated savings 
by shrewd and conscienceless ‘securities’ manipulators, as during recent 
years.”3 
This is not to say that Congress questioned the commitment of the states 
to investor protection. Instead, lawmakers attributed the shortcomings of 
state-only enforcement to securities fraudsters’ ability to operate in the more 
lightly (or un-) regulated states or by conducting sales on an interstate basis. 
Thus, two important goals of the federal legislation were to provide uniform 
standards for offering securities to the public4 and to eliminate the ability of 
scammers to “tak[e] advantage of State boundaries.”5  
While there were occasional nods toward the need to avoid too many, or 
inconsistent, regulations, the single-minded preoccupation of lawmakers 
appears to have been protecting investors and preventing fraud. Indeed, the 
1933 and 1934 Acts included explicit provisions preserving existing state 
authority to regulate intrastate activities. In sum, Congress’ apparent intent at 
this early stage was to “supplement and strengthen” the existing state 
regimes,6 rather than replace them with a single federal regime.  
While in 1933, lawmakers thought of federal standards as essential to 
 1. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 
353-60 (1991); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for A Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 
J. CORP. L. 1, 19 (1983). 
 2. Hearing on the Federal Securities Act: A Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the 
Proposed Federal Securities Act (submitted for the record by the Department of Commerce), 73d 
Cong. 93-94 (1933) [hereinafter “Economic Study”]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. It is worth noting that the desire for—and recognition of the importance of—national 
uniformity in securities laws did not first arise from adoption of the federal securities laws. In fact, the 
first significant effort to achieve a more uniform approach to securities regulation occurred several 
years earlier, in 1929, with the development of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This model state statute was adopted by only 
seven states. Dennis C. Hensley, The Development of a Revised Uniform Securities Act, 40 BUS. LAW. 
721, 722 (1985). 
 5. Economic Study, supra note 2, at 101. 
 6. Id. 
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achieving investor protection, decades later, Congress came to view federal 
standards as the key to a new priority—efficiency. Congress’ first clear 
articulation of this new priority was in 1980, when it adopted the Small 
Business Investment Incentive Act, adding Section 19(c) to the Securities 
Act. Section 19(c) (now Section 19(d)) mandated greater federal/state 
cooperation in order to, among other things, maximize uniformity in federal 
and state standards and minimize “interference” with capital formation.7 Like 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, however, it explicitly preserved existing state 
authority.8  
By 1996, Congress was moved to address the more practical difficulties 
arising from the patchwork quilt of state regulation.9 In the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), in contrast to the prior 
federal securities laws, Congress explicitly pre-empted vast areas of state 
regulation.10 The Conference Committee that approved NSMIA explained in 
its joint statement: “[T]he system of dual Federal and state securities 
regulation has resulted in a degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation 
. . . that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.”11 In short, 
Congress could hardly have been clearer in articulating its intent that our dual 
regulatory system promote efficiency and competitiveness whenever 
possible. Congress worried that our dual system of regulation had become 
dueling systems, burdening capital formation, job creation, and commercial 
innovation.  
At the same time, the drafters of NSMIA were careful to explain that 
while eliminating regulatory burdens, the Act “preserve[ed] important 
investor protections by reallocating responsibility over the regulation of the 
nation’s securities markets in a more logical fashion between the Federal 
 7. Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Laws, Securities Act 
Release No. 8072, at 1-2, 77 SEC Docket 716  (Mar. 20, 2002). 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(d)(1)-(d)(6). 
 9. The effort to encourage nationwide uniformity through creation of a model state securities 
law had been renewed in 1947. During that period, no two blue sky laws were identical, and the 47 
statutes altogether contained a whopping 2,800 exemptions. Hensley, supra note 4, at 721. Nine years 
later, in 1956, a model act was approved by the relevant drafting bodies. Id. The Uniform Standards 
Act of 1956, or variations thereon, subsequently was adopted in 39 jurisdictions. The Uniform 
Securities Act was revised in 1985, but adopted in that form by only a few states. It was again 
redrafted in 2002. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE NEW UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 1 (2002). These dogged, 
long-running (and thus far fruitless) efforts to develop a consensus model-act evidence the value legal 
experts have placed on attaining greater uniformity in securities regulation.  
 10. Kevin A. Jones, The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for 
Efficient Capital Formation, 53 ARK. L. REV. 153, 154 (2000). 
 11. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Conference Report—National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, HR 3005, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-864 (1996). 
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government and the states.”12 Specifically, under the legislation, the states 
were to “continue to exercise their police power to prevent fraud and broker-
dealer sales practice abuses,” but abstain from regulation of “the securities 
registration and offering process.”13 Moreover, Congress was explicit that the 
prohibitions on state authority “applied both to direct and indirect State 
action.”14 That is, states were not to use the regulatory authority they retained 
to exercise the sort of authority that had been preempted.  
LESSONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Let me pause here to summarize what I believe is evident from even this 
brief discussion of the history of the securities laws. First, aggressively 
protecting investors and instilling in them confidence in the fairness of our 
markets is critical to Congress’ vision of oversight of our capital markets. 
Second, especially in recent years, Congress has likewise emphasized the 
goals of efficiency and competitiveness in our capital markets, and has 
concluded that uniformity in regulation is a pre-requisite to achieving these 
goals. Third, Congress continues to believe in the efficacy of a dual 
regulatory system in which both federal and state agencies serve specific, 
valuable functions.  
In my view, these broad principles can provide helpful guidance to 
federal and state securities regulators as we carry out our separate and 
overlapping duties. Indeed, these general principles can have very specific 
implications in practice. I’ll use the remainder of my time to discuss these 
implications. 
APPLYING THE LESSONS TO FEDERAL/STATE COOPERATION 
First, there is no question in my mind that the imperative to achieve 
consistent regulation of the U.S. securities markets, and of the vast majority 
of domestic securities offerings, regardless of locale, dictates the need for a 
single, dominant regulator. Coordinated efforts to achieve uniformity among 
the states, and between the states as a group and the federal system, have 
fallen short, even after decades of trying. In adopting NSMIA, Congress 
expressed its intent to “further advance the development of national securities 
markets” by establishing the SEC as “the exclusive regulator of national 
 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 30 (1996) 
[hereinafter “House Report”]. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p545 Cutler book pages.doc10/27/03   2:19 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
550 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:545 
 
 
 
 
 
offerings of securities.”15 In a global economy, in which U.S. competitors are 
taking dramatic steps to integrate their markets and eliminate barriers, a 
national market is more important than ever.  
Moreover, the SEC is able to bring to its consideration of matters 
affecting our markets a broader perspective—one informed by national 
economic and international policy developments—than can any one state. 
Accordingly, when confronted with circumstances requiring cooperation or 
coordination, federal and state securities regulators should keep Congress’ 
command firmly in mind. Our mutual goal should be to avoid re-balkanizing 
(to paraphrase Chairman Donaldson) the securities markets, and effectively, 
undoing the work Congress has done. We, as public servants and policy 
makers, should ask ourselves how the actions we contemplate taking as 
federal or state actors would promote or detract from Congress’ vision of a 
truly national market system. 
This is not meant to suggest, however, that I believe the states should be 
relegated to the backseat of our regulatory system. Let me be clear: state 
securities agencies have played—and should continue to play—a significant 
role in making our securities markets the most respected and trusted in the 
world. The more resources—federal and state—we can bring to the cause of 
maintaining this status, the better off we are. By working together, state and 
federal regulators can help to ensure that our markets remain the envy of the 
world.  
That brings me to the next or second guiding principle. It is clear that 
protecting investors from fraud must always remain central to our missions. 
The primary goal of the lawmakers who drafted and adopted the first federal 
securities statutes was, undoubtedly, investor protection. They were coming 
to the aid of the many “investors [who] were induced to exchange hard-
earned savings of a lifetime for ‘securities’ which were not worth the paper 
on which they were engraved or printed.”16 According to the legislative 
record the members took pains to create, Congress was moved to action by 
“[r]ecent disclosures in financial circles [that shook] public confidence to its 
very foundations.’”17 Perhaps not coincidentally, these concerns have a 
surprisingly contemporary sound to them.  
The Congress that considered NSMIA some 60 years later was not so 
single-minded, but still unquestionably viewed protection of investors as a 
high priority. Although the legislation focused on the need to streamline the 
dual securities regulatory system, the exhortations to enhance 
 15. House Report, supra note 14, at 16. 
 16. Economic Study, supra note 2, at 92. 
 
 17. Id. 
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competitiveness and efficiency consistently were qualified by the need to 
preserve aggressive and vigorous investor protection mechanisms.  
Thus, lawmakers made clear that the legislation “preserved the authority 
of the states to protect investors through application of state antifraud laws 
. . . [and] to exercise their police power to prevent fraud and broker-dealer 
sales practice abuses.”18 The state enforcement agencies were characterized 
as the “local cop[s] on the beat” who were best positioned to quickly detect 
and address the needs of individual investors.19 And, of course, the states 
have proven themselves highly effective in investigating and charging those 
who defraud their residents, and continue to be committed to doing so.20  
This alignment of congressional intent and state regulators’ agendas 
suggests another or third principle that should inform the judgments of 
securities regulators. We should expect state agencies—and respect the right 
of state agencies—to pursue fraudulent conduct within their jurisdictions. 
State regulators are an important part of the arsenal needed to combat 
securities law misconduct. The SEC will never have resources sufficient to 
investigate every allegation of fraud, particularly those affecting a small 
number of geographically-concentrated investors. Active state enforcement 
programs can only benefit such investors.  
Moreover, a visible and aggressive state enforcement machine may 
motivate federal regulators, like me, to respond more quickly to potential 
securities-related misconduct. Of course, if we in the federal government 
want to be the dominant securities enforcement authority, we must be 
vigilant in protecting the investing public. And I think I can safely say that 
Chairman Donaldson, as well as the Commission and its staff, are single-
minded in our determination to do just that.  
Such competition among regulators, to be the first on the scene, if 
tempered by the other principles I’ve identified, will help ensure that 
investors’ needs are addressed promptly. As public servants, we must admit 
to ourselves, however, the possibility that a contest to be the most responsive 
regulator could too easily become a contest to be the most popular but most 
irresponsible regulator. This in turn can have untold costs—to investors, to 
issuers, to financial institutions, to the capital markets, to the justice system, 
and, ultimately, to our credibility as regulators. Federal and state securities 
agencies must bear this in mind at all times and exercise our judgment and 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40. 
 19. See NASAA President Christine Bruenn’s Speech to Annual Conference of the North 
American Securities Administrators Association, Philadelphia, PA (Oct. 1, 2002), at 
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/Files/File_Uploads/Bruennspeech.37528-49824.doc. 
 20. Id. 
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discretion accordingly. As Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson 
eloquently cautioned in a speech he made as Attorney General: “While the 
prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, 
when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.”21 
In sum, as federal regulators, we must acknowledge the value of the 
states’ enforcement firepower, and, in return, prevail upon our state 
counterparts to recognize that when a state enforcement matter implicates a 
competing federal regulatory interest, consultation and cooperation with the 
Commission may be critical.  
That brings me to the fourth and final guiding principle: adherence to 
Congress’ particular vision of what our dual regulatory system should be. As 
I’ve already discussed, lawmakers were quite explicit that those areas of 
regulation reserved to the federal system should be immune not just from the 
direct exercise of state authority, but also from the indirect exercise of such 
authority. In my view, this command creates important considerations for the 
exercise of state enforcement authority. Let me explain. 
As an enforcement lawyer, I am quite familiar with the complaint, often 
raised by defendants or respondents, and even by an occasional SEC 
Commissioner, that a proposed settlement amounts to rulemaking by 
enforcement. While I’m confident that we hear that argument far more often 
than warranted, it points up that an enforcement proceeding can, in fact, 
realign an industry standard. That is, when faced with the risks and costs of 
litigating an enforcement action, some parties may agree in settlement to 
change or restrict their future conduct in significant and far-reaching ways. 
So what does this have to do with NSMIA and dual regulation? 
Consider that, though varying in their breadth, state securities fraud 
statutes are commonly enforceable through criminal sanctions and civil 
remedies that, for regulated entities, can be as extreme as the loss of a 
license. As has been vividly demonstrated, in some circumstances, the 
prospect of being charged with fraud, even civilly, creates very high stakes 
for securities-industry participants—indeed, so high, that state regulators may 
find themselves in a position to dictate dramatic changes in conduct to 
settling parties. In short, they will have the leverage to effect rule changes 
through enforcement. Why is this a particular problem in the context of the 
dual regulatory system? It’s a problem because Congress clearly intended, 
when it adopted NSMIA, that the federal government, not the states, 
establish the rules and policies governing the securities markets, and that it 
 21. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, The Federal Prosecutor: Address 
at The Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940). 
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do so on a national, rather than piecemeal, basis. Moreover, Congress 
specifically warned that the states should not rely on their residual power to 
set regulatory standards for the national markets. As state and federal 
regulators navigate the waters of our dual regulatory system, this 
congressional command should guide our decisions. Otherwise, we may 
destroy the balance Congress struck in its effort to strengthen and streamline 
our national market system. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of the appropriate roles of the federal and state governments 
in our dual securities regulatory system has arisen continually for 70 years, 
and it’s not likely to go away anytime soon. Although some may question the 
value of legislative history generally, on this subject I believe it can provide 
federal and state securities regulators with a useful roadmap. The lawmakers 
who created the dual regulatory system, and those who have maintained it, 
clearly expressed the belief that regulatory uniformity imposed at the national 
level, coupled with aggressive and overlapping enforcement authority would 
best foster fair and efficient markets. And frankly, it’s hard to argue with 
their results to date. But with today’s increasingly complex and international 
securities markets, we need to proceed carefully. As we exercise the 
discretion with which Congress entrusted us, it is important that both federal 
and state securities regulators bear in mind the balance Congress sought to 
strike. 
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